Revenue Sharing Was Meant to Rein In College Sports Spending. It May Be Fueling a New Arms Race Instead.
College athletics entered the revenue-sharing era with a promise of financial discipline, but the early evidence suggests the new system is not containing costs so much as reshaping how schools spend. As programs layer sponsorships, rights deals and donor-backed support on top of the cap, the biggest brands appear positioned to widen the gap even further.
CHICAGO – College athletics entered the revenue-sharing era with a promise of structure. The early reality, however, suggests the new model may be exposing just how difficult it is to control spending in a market built on competitive escalation.
For athletic departments, the landmark House settlement was supposed to establish a clearer financial framework. Instead, it has quickly raised a more complicated business question: how can schools realistically stay within a cap when the incentives to spend keep expanding?
Approved in June, the settlement created a 10-year agreement with a $20.5 million cap, a figure expected to rise to $21.3 million in 2026-27. On paper, the system was designed to impose discipline. In practice, it is already becoming clear that the cap may be only one layer in a much larger spending equation.
Michigan coach Dusty May pointed to the imbalance created by football’s outsized share of resources and the governance failures that helped produce the current environment. His comments reflected more than frustration over payroll inflation. They underscored a business model in which schools are now trying to contain the consequences of years of unchecked escalation.
“When they [announced] these numbers, I thought, ‘Wow, is everyone going to be under this cap?'” May said ahead of Friday’s game against Alabama. “And then, football spends three times – I don’t spend a lot of time thinking about it. I have my own opinions on where the game needs to go and why we failed our sport for so long as coaches and administrators to let it get to this point.
“But ultimately, it’s our fault. We’ve been making these decisions on such an obtuse level for so long that now it’s blown up in our face. So now we have a responsibility to fix it and to make sure it’s equitable and fair for everyone.”
The financial pressure is already visible. Since revenue sharing began, roster costs have continued to rise, and the Sweet Sixteen has become a case study in how aggressively programs are investing to stay competitive. Data from Opendorse showed college men’s basketball teams received an average of $4.2 million in revenue-share dollars in 2025-26, while leading programs continue to add more spending on top of those figures.
That layering is where the disruption becomes most significant. Schools are increasingly using multimedia rights partners, apparel agreements and corporate sponsorships to push beyond the apparent cap, turning what was intended to be a hard financial boundary into a negotiable component of a broader commercial strategy.
For athletic departments, that changes the competitive calculus. The cap was meant to bring restraint, but the early market suggests the most ambitious programs are treating it as one piece of a larger spending architecture. That gives schools with the strongest commercial infrastructure even more room to separate from the field.
May said he continues to hear the figures being discussed by agents and throughout the industry, but he remains unconvinced the system is operating as intended.
“I don’t know,” he said. “I’ve heard the numbers. I’ve heard from agents. It doesn’t seem as though the rev-share number is any type of hard cap. Or soft cap.”
That uncertainty is the central business problem. If the cap is porous, revenue sharing may not level college sports at all. Instead, it could legitimize a new arms race, one in which the biggest brands, richest donor networks and most sophisticated sponsorship ecosystems retain the upper hand.
Why It Matters
College athletics entered the revenue-sharing era with a promise of financial discipline, but the early evidence suggests the new system is not containing costs so much as reshaping how schools spend. As programs layer sponsorships, rights deals and donor-backed support on top of the cap, the biggest brands appear positioned to widen the gap even further.
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College sports’ new revenue-sharing cap is already under pressure. The $20.5M cap (rising to $21.3M) may not be a hard limit—schools could “spend around it” via other revenue channels. https://on3.com
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College athletics entered the revenue-sharing era with a promise: bring structure, discipline, and sustainability to the way schools fund competition. But early signals suggest a familiar challenge is resurfacing—when incentives reward spending, it’s hard to enforce a cap that’s meant to limit it. According to On3 NIL, the House settlement approved in June established a 10-year framework starting with a $20.5M cap that’s expected to rise to $21.3M in 2026–27. The intent was clear: create guardrails so programs can’t simply outspend rivals indefinitely. However, the central business issue quickly becomes less about the cap’s existence and more about the system’s ability to stop spending once competition heats up. As Michigan coach Dusty May pointed out, football’s outsized share—and the broader governance structure that produced the imbalance—has intensified the pressure. The concern isn’t only the number itself, but whether it functions as a true boundary. May’s comments reflect a growing industry worry: the rev-share figure may not operate as a “hard cap” or even a “soft cap.” If programs can invest heavily beyond the stated revenue-share limits, the result could be a new form of arms race—one that’s less about parity and more about competitive advantage. Why? Because schools aren’t running a single fixed payroll model. They can build parallel funding strategies through: - multimedia rights - apparel partnerships - corporate sponsorships - other commercial arrangements In that environment, the cap risks becoming one line item inside a much larger commercial strategy. Programs with stronger brands, deeper donor networks, and premium sponsorship inventory may have more flexibility than others—meaning the “leveling” effect of revenue sharing could be limited. Opendorse data highlighted by the article shows men’s basketball teams receiving an average of $4.2M in revenue-share dollars in 2025–26, while major programs continue adding spending through additional channels. Takeaway: If the cap is porous, revenue sharing may not prevent overspending—it may simply formalize a new market reality where the biggest ecosystems can preserve (or even widen) their advantage. The next phase of college sports business will likely hinge on enforcement clarity and how “spend beyond cap” is defined, monitored, and regulated. Without that, the model could evolve from a discipline tool into a starting point for creative accounting and aggressive roster investment. What do you think: will governance tighten to make the cap real—or will the arms race adapt faster than the rules? #CollegeSports #NIL #RevenueSharing #SportsBusiness #SportsLaw #Athletics
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing
Revenue-sharing cap in college sports? Sounds clean on paper—until incentives take over. Coaches worry it’s not a true hard limit. Watch how schools may “spend around” the cap. #CollegeSports #NIL #RevenueSharing #SportsBusiness #MarchMadness
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing
College athletics hoped revenue sharing would create financial discipline—but early reports suggest the cap may not hold. The framework starts at a $20.5M limit and rises to $21.3M, yet coaches and industry voices question whether programs can spend beyond it through other commercial channels. Read more from On3 NIL.
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing
College sports just got a revenue-sharing cap… but is it actually a cap? Here’s the issue: the new model starts at $20.5 million, rising to $21.3 million, meant to bring order. But teams may have found a workaround. Michigan coach Dusty May says the rev-share number doesn’t seem like a hard or even soft limit. If schools can invest through other channels—like sponsorships, apparel deals, and media rights—then the cap could become more of a starting point than a boundary. So instead of leveling the playing field, could this turn into a new arms race? What do you think—will enforcement tighten, or will spending adapt faster than the rules?
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing
College sports revenue sharing was supposed to bring a cap—and some discipline—to spending. The framework begins at $20.5M and is set to rise to $21.3M. But early results are raising doubts. Michigan coach Dusty May says the rev-share number doesn’t seem like a true hard cap—or even a soft one. Why? Because schools may still be able to spend heavily through other commercial channels: sponsorships, apparel partnerships, and multimedia deals. So will this create parity… or just formalize a new arms race where the biggest brands have more room to maneuver? That’s the big question as college sports enters its next business phase.
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing
Revenue sharing was supposed to CAP college sports spending… but early signs say it’s becoming an “arms race.” Football-driven incentives + added sponsorships/media deals may be accelerating costs. 👀 #CollegeSports #NIL #RevenueSharing #MarchMadness #SportsBusiness #SportsLaw #Athletics
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing#SportsBusiness#SportsLaw#Athletics#MarchMadness
Revenue sharing was meant to cap college sports spending—but early returns suggest the “cap” may be porous. With football’s outsized share and added commercial deals, the arms race could be accelerating. #NIL #CollegeSports
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing#SportsBusiness#SportsLaw#Athletics#MarchMadness
College athletics entered the revenue-sharing era with a promise: structure. The landmark House settlement—approved in June—was designed to create discipline around spending via a 10-year agreement and a stated cap ($20.5M, rising to $21.3M in 2026–27). But the early market signals a bigger problem than payroll inflation: the cap may not function as a true limit. According to On3 NIL, roster costs continue to rise since revenue sharing began, and the Sweet Sixteen is already looking like a case study in competitive investment. In 2025–26, Opendorse data shows men’s basketball teams received an average of $4.2M in revenue-share dollars—yet leading programs appear to layer additional spending on top of those figures. Why? Because the “cap” is increasingly being treated as one line item in a broader commercial strategy. Schools and programs are leaning on multimedia rights partners, apparel agreements, and corporate sponsorships to push past the apparent ceiling. Michigan coach Dusty May’s comments capture the governance reality. He questioned whether anyone will truly remain under the cap, pointing to how football’s disproportionate share and long-running administrative failures have shaped the current spending incentives. His broader point: the system may be shifting from “controlled escalation” to “negotiable escalation,” where the programs with the strongest commercial infrastructure gain additional separation. The central business risk is uncertainty. If revenue-share numbers aren’t a hard or even soft cap—agents and industry conversations suggest they aren’t—then revenue sharing may not level the playing field. It could instead legitimize a new arms race, reinforcing advantages for the biggest brands, richest donor networks, and most sophisticated sponsorship ecosystems. For athletic departments, the question now isn’t simply how to comply with the cap. It’s whether the cap can meaningfully constrain total spending when the incentives—and the revenue channels—keep expanding. What happens next will depend on enforcement clarity, reporting transparency, and whether the market can be reined in—or whether college sports simply finds new ways to spend faster.
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing#SportsBusiness#SportsLaw#Athletics#MarchMadness
College sports revenue sharing was intended to bring financial structure—starting with a stated spending cap under the House settlement. But early returns suggest the cap may be more “porous” than controlling, as roster costs keep rising and programs layer additional spending through sponsorships, apparel, and media rights. Michigan coach Dusty May even questioned whether schools are truly staying under the cap, pointing to how football’s outsized share and governance failures have fueled escalation. The big question: will revenue sharing level the playing field—or accelerate a new arms race where the biggest commercial ecosystems pull further ahead?
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing#SportsBusiness#SportsLaw#Athletics#MarchMadness
College sports said revenue sharing would fix spending. But here’s what’s happening instead: The settlement set a cap—$20.5M, rising to $21.3M—supposedly to control costs. Yet early data and reports show roster spending keeps climbing. Why? The “cap” may not be a real cap. Programs are using other money streams—media rights partners, apparel deals, and corporate sponsorships—to add spending on top of revenue-share dollars. Coach Dusty May even questioned whether anyone will actually stay under the cap, citing football’s outsized impact and years of escalation. So the question is: does revenue sharing create discipline—or just a new way to keep the arms race going?
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing#SportsBusiness#SportsLaw#Athletics#MarchMadness
Revenue sharing was supposed to cap college sports spending… but early signs suggest it may be doing the opposite. A settlement created a 10-year framework with a spending cap: $20.5M, rising to $21.3M in 2026–27. But roster costs have continued to climb since revenue sharing began. And leading programs appear to “layer” extra spending on top of revenue-share dollars. How? Through deals that sit outside the headline cap—media rights partners, apparel agreements, and corporate sponsorships. Michigan coach Dusty May summed it up bluntly: he doesn’t believe the rev-share number is a hard or even soft cap. If the cap can be worked around, revenue sharing might not level the playing field—it could legitimize a new arms race. What do you think: cap… or loopholes?
#CollegeSports#NIL#RevenueSharing#SportsBusiness#SportsLaw#Athletics#MarchMadness
Revenue sharing was meant to curb college sports spending—but early signs suggest it’s becoming a new arms race. If the “cap” is porous, the richest brands may pull even farther ahead. #NIL
#CollegeSports#NIL#SportsBusiness
Revenue sharing entered college sports with a clear promise: introduce structure, impose discipline, and rein in the spending that fueled years of competitive escalation. But the early reality is raising a harder business question—whether the incentives to spend are now simply outgrowing the framework meant to contain them. A recent piece in On3 NIL points to the House settlement’s 10-year revenue-sharing agreement and its stated cap ($20.5M, rising to $21.3M in 2026–27). On paper, that number should create a meaningful boundary. In practice, the concern is that the “cap” may be only one layer in a much larger spending equation. Michigan coach Dusty May’s comments get at the core issue: football’s disproportionate resources, historical governance failures, and the industry’s broader inability to control escalation. But beyond the frustration, his remarks highlight something fundamentally structural. If revenue-share figures aren’t functioning as a hard—or even consistent soft—cap, then schools may be effectively free to build a competitive advantage on top of the system. The data underscores the risk. Since revenue sharing began, roster costs have continued to rise, and the Sweet 16 is increasingly a snapshot of how aggressively programs are investing to stay competitive. Opendorse data cited in the article shows men’s basketball teams receiving an average of $4.2M in revenue-share dollars in 2025–26, while leading programs add additional spending beyond those amounts. That “layering” may be the disruption point. Schools and athletic departments can use multimedia rights partners, apparel deals, and corporate sponsorships to move around the apparent boundary—turning a financial limit into a negotiable input within a broader commercial strategy. The competitive calculus changes: the cap that was intended to bring restraint may instead widen the gap between programs with sophisticated sponsorship ecosystems and those without. If the cap is porous, revenue sharing may not equalize anything. It could legitimize a new arms race—one where the upper hand belongs to the biggest brands, the richest donor networks, and the most advanced sponsorship infrastructure. The industry’s next challenge isn’t just compliance. It’s whether the governance model can truly manage incentives in a market where competition is rewarded through spending, media exposure, and commercial partnerships. What will you watch next: whether revenue-share caps are treated as true boundaries, or whether sponsorship and media deals continue to accelerate spending beyond the headline numbers?
#CollegeSports#NIL#SportsBusiness
Revenue sharing promised a spending “cap”… but early signs say it’s becoming a new arms race. If the boundary is porous, the richest brands & sponsorship ecosystems pull ahead. #CollegeSports #NIL #SportsBusiness #Basketball #RevenueSharing #Athletics
#CollegeSports#NIL#SportsBusiness
Revenue sharing was supposed to rein in college sports spending, but the early results suggest the “cap” may not be limiting budgets the way it was intended. As programs layer revenue-share dollars with sponsorships, media deals, and apparel partnerships, the competitive gap could widen—turning the system into a potential arms race. Read more on On3 NIL.
#CollegeSports#NIL#SportsBusiness
Revenue sharing was meant to stop college sports spending from spiraling… but it might be doing the opposite. Here’s why: even with a stated cap, schools can add money through other commercial channels—like sponsorships, media rights, and apparel deals—so the “cap” may not be a real boundary. Michigan coach Dusty May basically called it out: he doesn’t see the revenue-share number functioning like a hard cap. So if the biggest programs have the strongest brands and sponsorship networks, they can keep escalating—and others have to follow to compete. Bottom line: revenue sharing may not be leveling the playing field—it could be fueling a new arms race.
#CollegeSports#NIL#SportsBusiness
Revenue sharing was sold as the fix for runaway college sports spending—but the early evidence suggests the cap may be more like a guideline. A settlement set a 10-year framework with a $20.5M cap, rising to $21.3M. The problem? Spending doesn’t stop at that number. Programs can “layer” additional investment through sponsorships, multimedia rights, apparel deals, and corporate partnerships. Michigan coach Dusty May questioned whether the revenue-share figure is actually a hard or soft cap—and pointed to how football’s outsized resources shape the environment. If the cap is porous, the biggest brands and richest donor ecosystems may gain even more advantage. So instead of ending the arms race, revenue sharing could be institutionalizing it—by letting the spending escalate in smarter, more commercial ways.
#CollegeSports#NIL#SportsBusiness
